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5.1  Introduction 
In this paper I examine various conceptual and data issues related to trade 
and investment in China. This topic is interesting because China is the most 
dynamic, fastest growing economy in the world. Despite cycles of  inflation 
and contraction, real GDP in China has grown at almost 10 percent annually 
over the period  1979-92.  For the coastal provinces, from Guangdong in  the 
south up through Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang to Shandong in the north, the an- 
nual growth rate averaged over 12 percent for the same period (Ho 1993). This 
economic performance has led many to predict that China will one day be 
the next economic superpower (Survey of China 1992). For example, Larry 
Summers (1992) once extrapolated  that  if  the  growth  differential  between 
China and the United States during the 1980s persists, China could surpass the 
United  States to become the largest economy in  the world in  I1 years. He 
further pointed out that if the per capita income of China reached that of Tai- 
wan, China’s GDP would exceed that of all Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development (OECD) countries. According to estimates by  the 
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Table 5.1  China’s Foreign Merchandise Trade 

































































Source: China, State Statistical Bureau (1994). 
Note; Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. Exports are valued  on a f.0.b. basis, imports on a 
c.i.f. basis. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( 1993), based on purchasing-power-parity 
exchange rates, China has the third highest GDP in the world, behind only the 
United States and Japan. Some argue that China’s economic performance since 
the economic reform era has brought about one of the biggest improvements 
in human welfare anywhere at any time (Survey of China 1992).’ 
Since December  1978, when the history-making third plenary  session of 
the eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to 
abandon the Stalinist strategy for growth and opted for a program of open door 
policies and reforms, there has been a tremendous increase in China’s foreign 
trade activities. In the prereform era, China had traded relatively little with the 
outside  world,  given its  size. By  1992, China’s  total  foreign trade  volume 
ranked eleventh in the world, a jump from thirty-second in 1979. Using China’s 
official statistics, table 5.1 shows the changes over time in China’s trade.? 
1. As China grows in importance, the amount of research into various aspects of China has also 
exploded; see, e.g., Lau (1995), Wong (1995), Wong, Heady, and Woo (1993), and  McKinnon 
(199  I ). However, work on the foreign trade of China and direct investment in the country has been 
relatively sparse. Exceptions are, e.g., Sung (1991), Liu et al. (1992), Lardy (1994). Fung (1997, 
1996),  Fung and Iizaka (1998), and Fung and Lau (1996). Baldwin and Nelson (1993), Bergsten 
and Noland (1993), Feenstra (1993, Ito and Krueger (1993). and Noland (1990) contain recent 
research related to trade and trade policies with Taiwan or Hong Kong. 
2. As  Lardy  (1992) points out, even different agencies within the Chinese government report 
Chinese data differently. For example, Ministry on Foreign Economic Relations and Trade export 
statistics on processing include only the processing fees earned from such exports, which are less 
than  10 percent of the value of the exports. By  contrast, China’s customs statistics include the 
entire value of these exports. 175  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
The money value of China’s merchandise exports of $85 billion (U.S. dol- 
lars) in 1992 was more than eight times the $9.8 billion in 1978. In nominal 
terms, this means a compound growth rate of  16.8 percent per year. For im- 
ports, the $80.6 billion in 1992 was more than seven times the $10.9 billion in 
1978. This translates into nominal growth of 15.4 percent. This is almost twice 
as fast as the growth of global trade for the same period. According to the 
OECD (1993), China was sixteenth by its share of global exports in 1990, with 
a share of 1.6  percent of world exports. But if we add Hong Kong and Taiwan 
to mainland China (Greater China), Greater China’s rank was fifth, behind only 
the United States, Japan, Germany, and France. 
Beyond the very rapid growth of China’s economy and trade and the coun- 
try’s new role as a global player, there are other reasons why I want to look 
into data concerning China’s trade. First, Chinese trade data are often at odds 
with the data of its trading partners. Trade data discrepancies are actually quite 
common, but the situation with China is particularly striking. In 1992, for ex- 
ample, according to Chinese statistics exports to the United States were $8.6 
billion and imports from the United States were $8.9 billion. This translates 
into a small U.S. surplus of $0.3 billion. But U.S. trade statistics show that 
imports from China were $25.7 billion and exports were $7.4 billion, resulting 
in a U.S. trade deficit of $18.3 billion. From an economic standpoint, bilateral 
trade imbalance is not generally a cause for concern, but political factors often 
cause trade imbalances to fuel trade frictions. Trade data discrepancies be- 
tween China and its trading partners heighten these trade tensions. 
A significant part of the discrepancy in trade data related to China is due to 
Chinese trade with  and via  Hong Kong, its  small but prosperous southern 
neighbor. According to China’s customs statistics, 44 percent of China’s 1992 
exports went to Hong Kong and 26 percent of China’s 1992 imports came from 
Hong Kong. Using these figures, Hong Kong is China’s largest trading partner. 
Because of its strategic location, its modern facilities in banking, finance, 
insurance, transportation, and other services, and the fact that there is a sound 
legal framework in place, Hong Kong is China’s main gateway to the West, 
and vice versa. Much of Hong Kong’s role in China’s trade is to act as a middle- 
man. This means that a lot of  trade involving Hong Kong is entrep6t trade: 
reexport and transshipment. Even after 30 June 1997, when Hong Kong will 
become officially a part of China, Hong Kong will remain a separate customs 
temtory and a separate member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)-more  accurately, the World Trade Organization (WT0)-according 
to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and also according to the promise 
that China had made to GATT. In other words, the problems with China’s trade 
data due to a separate Hong Kong are not likely to go away in the near future. 
Until very recently, China’s official trade data counted exports to Hong Kong 
for consumption in Hong Kong and exports to Hong Kong to be reexported 
elsewhere both as exports to Hong Kong. Similarly, U.S. goods reexported via 
Hong Kong to China are not always counted as U.S. exports to China in U.S. 176  K.C.Fung 
data. We will look at China’s trade by taking into account its important reexport 
character.3 One example of this complication is that using Chinese data, Hong 
Kong was the largest exporter to China from 1987 to 1992. But in 1993, when 
Chinese authorities began to trace the origin of  Chinese imports more seri- 
ously, Hong Kong dropped to fourth largest exporter behind Japan, the United 
States, and Taiwan (Sung 1994). 
Another source of  the problem with China’s trade statistics is the markup 
that the Hong Kong middleman  adds to reexports to and from China. This 
added value is attributed to the exporting country but in fact should be attrib- 
uted  to Hong  Kong. Thus, in addition  to reexports, trade data with  China 
should be adjusted by taking the reexport markup into account. Reexports and 
reexport markups affect China’s trade with all countries and regions, including 
the three on which we will focus in this paper, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the 
United States. Furthermore, both reexports and reexport markups are large and 
thus significantly affect Chinese trade data. 
Another interesting aspect of China’s trade is that a large part of it is fueled 
by  foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly investment by Hong Kong and 
Taiwan in Guangdong and Fujian. Exports and imports related to investment 
are not unique to China, but such FDI-related trade is especially important in 
the Greater China region. In Chinese trade data, both geography and foreign 
ownership play an important role. 
For geographical and historical reasons, China’s trade with Taiwan is of spe- 
cial interest. According to 1992 Chinese trade data, Taiwan is China’s fourth 
largest export market, behind Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States. Cold 
war politics and the historical rivalry between the Chinese Nationalists and the 
Chinese Communist Party caused most direct trade to be banned between Tai- 
wan and mainland China. In 1978, mainland China wanted to reestablish mail, 
travel, and trade. Taiwan initially responded with a continuation of the “three 
no’s policy”: no contact, no negotiations, no compromise (Kao 1993). How- 
ever, by  1985, Taiwan no longer interfered with indirect exports, though indi- 
rect imports were  still to be  subject to control. Taiwan’s control of  indirect 
imports would later be relaxed. Taiwan’s official policy is still that all trade and 
investment must be carried out indirectly. A substantial portion of trade be- 
tween mainland China and Taiwan is indirect reexport trade via Hong Kong. 
In addition to reexports, which also form a large part of China’s trade with 
its other trading partners (e.g., the United States), China-Taiwan trade is further 
characterized by forms of direct trade, such as transshipment, that are illegal 
from the Taiwanese ~tandpoint.~  Because of this illegal trade, statistics from 
Taiwan concerning China-Taiwan trade are also inaccurate. Based on the lim- 
ited information we have, illegal trade is a large part of trade between mainland 
China and Taiwan. 
3. Sung (1991) and, more recently, Lardy (1994), Fung (1997), and Fung and Iizaka (1998) 
4. Kao (1993) Sung (1994). and Fung (1997) discuss the issue of transshipment. 
were among the first to highlight quantitatively the importance of  reexports in China’s trade. 177  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
From the U.S. side, trade with China represents both an opportunity and an 
increasing concern, China can be a large and growing market for American 
business; at the same time, the United States is worried about trade barriers in 
the Chinese market and the export potential of the Chinese. These worries have 
fueled several trade disputes. Some of the disputes have focused on the differ- 
ent ways that both sides look at trade data. For the United States, reexports and 
reexport margins are the dominant factors complicating the trade data. 
In this paper I focus mainly on China’s trade with and via Hong Kong, Tai- 
wan, and the United  States. There will also be special attention paid to the 
southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian,  where most FDI from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan takes place. Hong Kong and Taiwan deserve special attention 
because of their roles in FDI, reexport, and transshipment. U.S.-China trade is 
of interest because it highlights how different trade-accounting methods in data 
can lead to trade problems between important economic powers. In the next 
section, I examine and update the recent evolution of the Chinese foreign trade 
regime. In section 5.3, I look at the role of Hong Kong reexports in China’s 
trade and discuss reexports and reexport margins in the context of trade with 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. In section 5.4, I cover the impor- 
tance of FDI-related trade, using first Hong Kong data, then official national 
Chinese data, and finally data from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. In 
section 5.5, I examine transshipment and other forms of illegal trade. There is 
some indication that smuggling is important for some segment of U.S.-China 
trade. Concluding remarks are given in section 5.6. 
5.2  China’s Evolving Foreign Trade Regime 
Various writers have written about China’s trade system (Sung 1991; Lardy 
1992; Ho  1993; Fung  1997). In this section, we update and condense their 
work. Before  1978, the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) completely con- 
trolled  China’s  foreign  trade  system.  Under  a  mandatory  trade  plan,  15 
product-specific national foreign trade corporations (FTCs) operated China’s 
trade. International trade was just an extension of the domestic planning pro- 
cess. The Soviet style of  material balances  was used  to construct the basic 
economic plan, which coordinated the flow of raw materials and intermediate 
goods among industries. The production of each good was equated to the inter- 
mediate and final demands by  other major  state enterprises. The plan used 
imports to fill the difference between planned demand and domestic produc- 
tion. Exports needed to pay for imports were then identified, first using goods 
of which there were excess supplies. The State Planning Commission set pre- 
liminary annual and long-term targets for broad categories of imports and ex- 
ports. Then, on the basis of the State Planning Commission’s targets, MOFT 
prepared more detailed plans and sent these plans to the FTCs. 
Based on the foreign trade plan, the FTCs purchased goods from domestic 
enterprises at fixed prices, sold them abroad, and sent all foreign exchange to 178  K.C.Fung 
the Bank of China, which was the sole organization allowed to handle foreign 
exchange. The FTCs bought fixed quantities of foreign goods for domestic use 
at fixed prices and paid foreign suppliers with foreign exchange obtained from 
the Bank of China. World market prices had little impact on the Chinese do- 
mestic prices of tradable  goods.  Since the renminbi  (the mainland  Chinese 
currency) was overvalued, the FTCs usually  suffered  a loss on  exports but 
earned a profit on imports. 
In  1979, provincial and municipal governments and some large state enter- 
prises were allowed to establish their own foreign trade enterprises. In March 
1982, China’s trade regime was further reformed. MOFT, the Import-Export 
Administration Commission, the Foreign Investment Administration Commis- 
sion, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations were consolidated into 
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), with the 
latter organization supervising the 15 national FTCs and the local foreign trade 
bureaus. Recently, MOFERT has been reorganized into the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and given the responsibility to 
formulate and implement China’s foreign trade policies. 
In  1984, the State Council ended the monopoly power of the national FTCs 
and reduced  the scope of foreign trade planning. The number  of  FTCs in- 
creased dramatically. In addition to the new national FTCs under the control 
of  central government ministries and other state organizations,  almost every 
provincial and municipal government had its own network of FTCs. 
With decentralization, the number of FTCs increased from  15 in  1978, to 
more than  1,000 by  the mid-l980s, to about 6,000 by  the latter half  of the 
1980s. The new FTCs did not have to report to MOFERT. Unfortunately, there 
were some unscrupulous activities, and some new FTCs were unable to fulfill 
their  contracts  (e.g.,  some were unable  to purchase  the  promised  domestic 
goods for export). Since China had a long-standing reputation of fulfilling for- 
eign contracts, the increasing failure to meet contractual obligations became a 
major concern not only to China’s trading  partners  but also to the Chinese 
central authority. 
These events led to a retrenchment in mid-1988. As many as 2,000 FTCs 
were dissolved, reorganized, or stripped of their right to conduct foreign trade. 
By the end of I99  1, there were roughly 4,000 FTCs. 
The scope of  mandatory planning for foreign trade was also significantly 
reduced. The old foreign trade system was replaced by a system that combined 
mandatory planning, guidance planning, and the market. The 1984 trade re- 
form assigned mandatory exports and imports (i.e., trade specified in quantita- 
tive terms) to designated national FTCs and allowed other FTCs to conduct 
their  trade both  within  and  outside the  guidance plans.  Unlike  mandatory 
plans, guidance plans were generally specified in value terms. In addition to 
being more  flexible, these plans allowed FTCs to take market demand and 
supply into account  when deciding the mix of tradables  within each broad 
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The mandatory export plan covered about 3,000 items before  1979, but by 
1988 the number fell to 112. By the end of the 198Os, exports under mandatory 
or guidance plans accounted for about 34 percent of total exports. Compared 
to the export system, the import system remained relatively unreformed in the 
1980s. There were import licensing and high tariffs on protected products. In 
addition, almost all importers faced a series of  complicated approval proce- 
dures. However, in the process of reforming the foreign trade system, the scope 
of mandatory planning for imports was also reduced. By 1991, no more than 
40 percent  of  China’s imports were under mandatory  or guidance plans. In 
addition, as a consequence of a US. market access Section 301 case in 1992 
and China’s desire to join the WTO, China has made progress in making its 
trade regime more transparent. 
In  1992, the Chinese government took important steps to reform its trade 
policy (World Bank 1993). A large number of trade documents previously un- 
available to foreigners were published. Several steps were also taken to liberal- 
ize imports. The Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council reduced a 
large number of tariff rates. Rates were cut on 225 tariff lines, beginning on 1 
January 1992. In addition, special import regulatory duties that had been insti- 
tuted for 14 products in 1985 were lifted as of 1 April 1992.5 
5.3  Issues Related to Reexports 
The only data source on reexports that I am aware of are the official statistics 
of the Hong Kong government. Reexports, as defined by the Hong Kong gov- 
ernment, occur when imports to Hong Kong are consigned to a buyer in Hong 
Kong who takes legal possession of the goods. These imports must clear cus- 
toms (that is why Hong Kong has such statistics). Buyers in Hong Kong add a 
markup and then reexport the goods elsewhere. They may also undertake mi- 
nor processing of the imports before reexporting them. However, they do not 
change the fundamental character or nature of the goods (no substantial trans- 
formation) so that no Hong Kong origin is supposed to be conferred. If  the 
process substantially changes the imports, then they become goods “made in 
Hong Kong,” and exports of these goods are regarded as exports of Hong Kong 
goods. They are then classified in official Hong Kong statistics as “domestic 
exports” rather than “reexports.” Sung (199 1) and, more recently, Lardy (1994) 
and Fung (1997) were among the first to consider the issue of reexports in the 
context of Hong Kong-China  trade. 
Reexports cost more than direct exports since they typically need additional 
loading, more customs clearing, and further insurance. The middleman also 
adds a markup before reexporting. In  1988, the Hong Kong Trade Develop- 
ment Council carried out a large-scale survey of Hong Kong traders. One find- 
5. However, the effects of these measures have been essentially to bring the average tariff level 
back to pre-1987 levels (see World Bank 1993). 180  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.2  Reexports in Hong Kong Trade 
Reexport Category  1992  1993 
I. Total reexports  690.8  823.2 
2. Reexports to China  212.1  274.6 
3.  Reexports of  Chinese origin  403.8  474.0 
4. Reexports not involving China  95.  I  96.5 
Source: Hong Kong Government (1993). 
Nore: Figures are in billions of  HK dollars. Rows 2, 3, and 4 sum to more than row  1 because re- 
exports of Chinese origin back to China have been counted twice in rows 2 and 3. 
ing was that the reexport markup on Chinese goods was  16 percent and the 
markup on other countries’ goods was 14 percent. Another survey conducted 
by  the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department  indicated  that the re- 
export markup for all reexports in 1990 was  13.4 percent but the markup for 
Chinese goods was much higher. The department, however, did not publish the 
exact markup figure for Chinese goods in this survey. The higher markup for 
Chinese goods probably reflects the lower quality control on goods in China 
and  Chinese producers’  lack of  information  about overseas markets.  Hong 
Kong middlemen thus need to do more repackaging  and to look harder for 
markets for Chinese products.6 
5.3.1  China-Hong  Kong Trade 
The bulk of trade between Hong Kong and China involves reexports. Hong 
Kong reexports registered significant growth in  1993. The value of reexports 
was HK$823 billion in 1993, about 19 percent higher than in 1992.’ As reex- 
ports grew rapidly while domestic exports by Hong Kong declined, the share 
of reexports in total Hong Kong exports rose from 75 percent in  1992 to 79 
percent in  1993. 
China was the most important source of  goods reexported through  Hong 
Kong.  In  1993,  Chinese  goods  reexported  via  Hong  Kong  amounted  to 
HK$474 billion, or 58 percent of total reexports (table 5.2).  A large proportion 
of  the reexports from China were products of  outward processing  commis- 
sioned by  Hong Kong companies in China.* The major reexport items from 
China were  clothing,  telecommunications and  sound  recording equipment, 
footwear, and textile yam and fabrics. China also remained the largest market 
for Hong Kong’s reexports, accounting for HK$275 billion, or 33 percent in 
6. Another interpretation is that the higher markup of Chinese goods reflects transfer pricing 
by mainland Chinese traders based  in  Hong Kong. I am indebted to Larry Lau  for suggesting 
this interpretation. 
7. The  exchange  rate  between  the  HK  and  US. dollars  is  fixed.  In  1993, the  rate  was 
U.S.$1 = HK$7.7. 
8. I discuss trade related to outward processing in section 5.4. 181  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.3  Hong Kong Reexports by Major Market 
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Source: Hong Kong Government (1993). 
Note: Reexports values are in billions of HK dollars. Numbers in parentheses are shares of the re- 
exports. 
value terms of all goods reexported through Hong Kong in 1993 (table 5.3). 
Reexports to China consisted mainly of textile yarn and fabrics, textile madeup 
articles, motor vehicles, electrical machinery, telecommunications and sound 
recording  equipment, industrial machinery, and plastic  materials. The other 
major market for Hong Kong’s reexports was the United States (accounting for 
HK$l80 billion, or 22 percent of the total value in 1993). 
Besides reexports, the Hong Kong government collects data on retained im- 
ports (imports for domestic consumption), which are defined as total imports 
by  Hong Kong minus reexports. A more accurate definition would be total 
imports minus reexports adjusted for the reexport mark~p.~ 
If we take the average markup on Chinese goods to be around 16 percent, 
the amount of retained imports from China becomes negligible or negative in 
recent years (table 5.4). This implies that the markup for Chinese goods must 
be higher than 16 percent. However, we do not have much information on what 
the actual percentage is. In my interviews with Hong Kong businessmen in 
July  1994, a figure of  25 percent was suggested  several times. Hong Kong 
officials who had presented cases in GATT also suggested that the markup was 
25 percent. For the rest of this paper, we use an average reexport markup of 25 
percent for Chinese goods. 
Data on Hong Kong’s exports to China also are complicated by the existence 
9. See Sung (1991) for an early discussion. 182  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.4  Hong Kong Imports from China 
Adjusted”  Unadjusted 











































Source: Hong Kong Government (various years, b). 
Note: Values are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
”Adjusted  for 25 percent reexport markup. 
of reexports. But, given that Hong Kong government statistics provide data on 
Hong Kong’s domestic exports, we can rely on these as figures for exports of 
Hong Kong goods to China. 
5.3.2  China-Taiwan  Trade 
As previously noted, Taiwan forbids Taiwanese firms from trading directly 
with China, so all trade is supposed to occur indirectly. Most of  this indirect 
trade takes place via Hong Kong. Trading via Hong Kong is often referred to 
as “triangular trade.” There is also indirect trade between Taiwan and mainland 
China via Japan, Singapore, Guam, and other third parties (Kao 1993). In terms 
of trade data, neither Taiwanese sources nor mainland sources are entirely ac- 
curate. The mainland data are again contaminated by lumping trade with Hong 
Kong and reexports together. In Taiwanese data, trade with China shows up 
mainly as trade with Hong Kong and other third parties. Table 5.5 shows Tai- 
wanese indirect trade via Hong Kong, using Hong Kong data. There is also 
illegal direct trade that is not recorded properly in Taiwanese trade statistics. 
Trade with mainland China is heavily influenced by periods of contraction in 
China. The significant decrease of indirect trade between Taiwan and the main- 
land in 1982-83  and in 1986 was due mainly to mainland China’s deflationary 
policies during those periods. 
5.3.3  China-U.S.  Trade 
Chinese export statistics reported  all exports to Hong Kong, whether for 
Hong Kong consumption or for reexport to the United States via Hong Kong 183  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.5  Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China via Hong Kong 











































Source: Hong Kong Government (various years, a). 
Note: Figures are in millions of  U.S. dollars. 
Table 5.6  U.S. Exports to China Adjusted for Reexports 
Reexports to China  Total Adjusted 
Year  U.S.  Source  via Hong Kong  Exports 
1993  8.77  2.79  (3.18)  11.56  (11.95) 
1992  7.47  2.06  (2.35)  9.53  (9.82) 
1991  6.29  1.50  (1.71)  7.79  (8.00) 
1990  4.81  1.16  (1.32)  5.97  (6.13) 
1989  5.76  1.16  (1.32)  6.92  (7.13) 
Suurce.y: Hong Kong Government (various years, a) and U.S. Department of Commerce (various 
years). 
Note: Figures are in billions 0f'U.S. dollars. Numbers in parentheses are unadjusted for reexport 
markup. 
as exports to Hong Kong. Chinese import statistics do take country of origin 
into account, but inconsistently. U.S. import data distinguish country of origin, 
including reexports, but U.S. export data deal with exports to Hong Kong inac- 
curately. This is because reexports, by definition, change legal possession, and 
US.  exporters do not always know the final destination of the US.  goods. 
In calculating US.  exports to China, we should add reexports of American 
goods via Hong Kong to China to recorded exports to China (although this 
may overstate the error because the U.S. data may capture some exporters who 
know and declare that the final destination of the goods is China even when 
they are first shipped to Hong Kong). Table 5.6 illustrates the importance of 
taking reexports into account when using US. export data. 
The amount of U.S. goods reexported to China via Hong Kong is not trivial. 184  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.7  Adjusted US.-China  Bilateral Trade Balance (US.  Source) 
~~ 
Year  Unadjusted Balance  Adjusted Trade Balance 
1993  -22.76  -15.63  (-19.59) 
1992  -  18.26  -12.58  (-15.91) 
1991  -  12.68  -8.50  (-10.97) 
1990  -  10.43  -7.17  (-9.11) 
1989  -6.18  -3.38  (-4.91) 
Sources: See table 5.6. 
Note; Figures  are in  billions of  U.S. dollars. Numbers in parentheses are not  adjusted for re- 
export margins. 
On average over 1989-93,  reexports were 30.0 percent of U.S. direct exports 
to China. Another  important issue is the role of  the reexport  margin. Hong 
Kong middlemen raise the value of the U.S. goods shipped via Hong Kong. 
The average markup on non-Chinese goods is 14 percent. Reexports and total 
exports not discounted by the markup are given in parentheses in table 5.6. 
U.S. imports take reexports into account. While there are severe difficulties 
in tracing the country of  origin (Krueger 1995), this problem is not unique to 
trade with China. We assume that U.S. data for imports from mainland China 
are by and large correct, or at least no worse than other published sources. But 
we do need to take the reexport margin into account. For Chinese goods, we 
take a markup of 25 percent, as discussed earlier. The adjusted trade balance, 
taking both reexports and reexport margins into account, is 
Adjusted U.S. trade balance with China 
= (Direct exports of U.S. goods to China 
+ Reexports of U.S. goods to China via Hong Kong 
-  14% reexport  margin) 
-  (Direct imports of Chinese goods to the U.S. 
+ Reexports of Chinese goods to the U.S. via Hong Kong 
-  25% Reexport margin). 
Using the adjusted figures, U.S.-China bilateral trade deficits are shown in 
table 5.7. The adjusted trade deficits, using U.S. and Hong Kong data, are quite 
different from the unadjusted, published deficits. If we use deficits adjusted for 
both reexports and reexport margins, the deficits have to be revised downward 
by 31.1,33.0,31.3, and45.3 percent for the years 1992, 1991, 1990, and 1989, 
respectively. This gives a four-year average of 35.2 percent.'O 
10. This downward revision is larger than those reported in Lardy (1994) primarily because of 
the use of a different reexport margin. West (1995) also reported different adjustments because 
she used different markups for different periods and she also took into account other minor adjust- 185  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.8  Adjusted U.S. Trade Deficit with China 
~~  ~~ 
Adjusted  Adjusted  Chinese  us. 
Year  Chinese Data  US. Data  Source  Source 
1989  2.14  (3.7)  3.38  (4.91)  -3.5  6.18 
1990  5.84  (7.8)  7.17  (9.11)  ~  1.4  10.43 
1991  7.42  (9.9)  8.50  (10.97)  -  1.8  12.68 
1992  12.12  (15.5)  12.58  (15.91)  -0.3  18.26 
1993  20.95  (24.9)  15.63  (19.59)  6.3  22.76 
Sources: See table 5.6 and China, General Administration of  Customs (various years) and Hong 
Kong Government (1993). 
Note: Figures are in  billions of U.S. dollars. Numbers in parentheses  are not  adjusted for re- 
export margins. 
Table 5.8 shows six different U.S. trade imbalances with China: published 
US. data, which show a growing trade deficit; published Chinese data, which 
show a U.S. surplus until 1993, when reexports were beginning to be consid- 
ered; Chinese data adjusted for reexports only (in parentheses); Chinese data 
adjusted for both reexports and reexport margins; U.S. data adjusted for reex- 
ports only (in parentheses); and U.S. data adjusted for both reexports and reex- 
port margins. The most reliable amount should be the U.S. data adjusted for 
both reexports and reexport margins. However, as noted earlier, this correction 
overstates the problem, since some U.S. firms that export to China via Hong 
Kong may know in advance the final destination and may declare this on their 
customs forms. 
If we compare the adjusted Chinese data with the U.S. published data, we 
see that the discrepancies are diminishing over time. As percentages of  the 
published U.S.  data, the adjusted Chinese data are 34.6, 56.0, 58.5, 66.4, and 
92.1 percent from 1989 to 1993, respectively. If we use adjusted U.S. data as 
the benchmark, as a percentage the differences between U.S. adjusted data and 
Chinese adjusted data are 36.7, 18.6, 12.7,3.66, and -34.0  percent from 1989 
to 1993. It is interesting that by 1992, the difference between the two adjusted 
numbers is negligible. This gives us indirect confirmation that our adjustments 
are not completely off the mark. 
5.4  Issues Related to FDI-Related Trade 
5.4.1  China-Hong  Kong Outward Processing Trade 
The Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department began to compile statis- 
tics on domestic exports and reexports to China related to outward processing 
in the third quarter of  1988 and statistics on imports from China related to 
outward processing in the first quarter of 1989. According to the Hong Kong 
government, outward processing arrangements are made between Hong Kong 
ments (such as the low-level threshold; it.,  US.  customs does not report export transactions that 
are under U.S.$2,500). 186  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.9  Hong Kong Domestic Exports to China of an Outward Processing 
Nature as a Share of Total Domestic Exports to China, by Product 
Group (percent) 




Machinery and electrical appliances 
Electronic products 
Watches and clocks 
Toys, games, and sporting goods 
Metals and metal products 
84.8  84.2  83.7 
85.1  87.9  89.6 
83.9  86. I  79.6 
56.7  62.2  58.6 
94.6  94.4  92.5 
98.5  97.3  98.1 
96.4  96.9  96.1 
64.2  71.1  73.5 
87.4  86.8 
93.2  94.2 
77.5  81.5 
59.7  54.0 
92.7  94.7 
98.5  98.6 
91.9  97.2 
69.0  65.  I 
All products  76.0  79.0  76.5  74.3  74.0 
Source: Hong Kong Government (various years, a). 
companies and manufacturing  entities in  China under which the companies 
concerned subcontract all or part of the production processes relating to their 
products to the Chinese entities. Raw materials or semimanufactures are ex- 
ported to China for such processing. The Chinese entity involved can be a local 
enterprise, a joint venture, or some other form of business involving foreign 
investment (Hong Kong Government 1994). Almost four-fifths of Hong Kong 
manufacturers have transferred production to China. About 25,000 factories in 
the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong are engaged in outward processing 
for Hong Kong companies, while 3 to 4 million workers are directly or indi- 
rectly employed by these firms (Ash and Kueh 1993). In 1993, the entire labor 
force in manufacturing in Hong Kong was only 0.5 million. Employment in 
China for outward processing of Hong Kong goods is then between six to eight 
times that in Hong Kong. Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 document, respectively, 
the extent of  domestic exports, imports, and reexports related to Hong Kong 
processing in China. 
From tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11, we see that 74 percent  of Hong Kong’s 
domestic exports to China were related to outward processing in  1993. The 
highest amount of outward processing was in watches and clocks, with 98.6 
percent. For the five years between  1989 and 1993, the overall percentage is 
fairly consistent, hovering between  74.3  and 79 percent. For imports  from 
China, there is an increase from a low of 58.1 percent in 1989 to a high of 73.8 
percent in 1993.  As with domestic exports, watches and clocks had the highest 
outward processing ratio in 1993. For Hong Kong’s reexports to China, table 
5.11 shows that in  1993, 42.1 percent of all products were for outward pro- 
cessing. Compared to domestic exports and imports, this lower ratio is due to 
the low outward processing character of bulkier reexports such as machinery 
and electrical appliances and metal and metal products (26.1 and 35.8 percent 
in  1993, respectively).  Bulkier  items tend to be produced  outside of  Hong 
Kong and reexported via Hong Kong to China without further processing. As 187  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.10  Hong Kong Imports from China of an Outward Processing Nature as 
a Share of Total Imports from China, by Product Group (percent) 
Product Group  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Textiles  12.8  18.2 
Clothing  84.5  87.4 
Plastic products  73.4  78.0 
Electric products  85.2  88.7 
Watches and clocks  94.6  94.9 
Toys, games, and sporting goods  94.1  94.8 
Metals and metal products  30.2  32.5 
All products  58.1  61.8 
Machinery and electrical appliances  77.8  73.3 
20.5  23.0  27.3 
86.6  84.4  83.1 
84.8  89.3  90.4 
78.7  81.0  76.4 
89.7  92.7  91.5 
96.4  94.3  95.8 
92.1  96.9  91.6 
29.6  43.6  52.3 
67.6  72.1  73.8 
Source: Hong Kong Government (various years, a) 
Table 5.11  Hong Kong Reexports to China of an Outward Processing Nature as 
a Share of Total Reexports to China, by Product Group (percent) 




Machinery and electrical appliances 
Electric products 
Watches and clocks 
Toys, games, and sporting goods 
Metals and metal products 
71.5  15.9 
87.3  86.5 
58.0  68.7 
24.9  31.2 
43.1  52.9 
93.5  96.9 
60.1  73.2 
37.8  46.4 
77.1  81.9  81.0 
84.1  76.0  80.2 
58.3  64.5  63.0 
26.7  27.3  26.1 
46.9  41.4  35.7 
96.3  97.7  98.7 
66.8  80.1  79.9 
48.1  34.8  35.8 
All products  43.6  50.3  48.2  46.2  42.1 
Source: Hong Kong Government (various years, a). 
regards  Hong  Kong's  reexports of  Chinese origin to  overseas markets  (not 
shown in the tables), 74, 78, and 81 percent were products of outward pro- 
cessing  arrangements commissioned from Hong  Kong  in  1991, 1992, and 
1993, respectively (Hong Kong Government 1994). 
Hong Kong's outward processing arrangements with China involve a combi- 
nation of  assembly by Chinese firms and production in China by Hong Kong- 
owned firms." Technically, this trade is not all related to FDI but is a combina- 
tion of  FDI and Hong Kong subcontracting. However, in practice, outward 
processing often involves situations in which the Hong Kong investor has de 
facto (though not necessarily legal) control of the operations. 
We can compare the above outward processing activities with the extent of 
intrafirm trade involving U.S. multinationals. In essence, we compare intrafirm 
I I.  I discuss the different types of foreign investment in China immediately following the sec- 
tion on outward processing from Hong Kong. 188  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.12  Intrafirm Exports and Intrafirm Imports as a Share of Total U.S. 
Exports and Imports with U.S. Parents, 1989 (percent) 
Industry  Exports  Imports 
Textile products and apparel  1 1.42  10.98 
Rubber and plastics  23.88  6.23 
Machinery  20.41  18.25 
Electric and electronic equipment  22.16  15.45 
Primary and fabricated metals  1.26  2.93 
All industries  24.64  15.46 
Sources; U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) and U.S. Bureau of  the Census, Slatisrical Ab- 
stract oj‘rhe UniredStures (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991). 
trade between Hong Kong parents and their affiliates in China to that between 
U.S. parents and their affiliates outside the United States. But the comparison 
is not exact because Hong Kong outward processing can involve some local 
mainland Chinese enterprises. The industries also are not entirely comparable 
across countries. Unlike Hong Kong, the United States does not have statistics 
related to intrafirm trade on reexports. Nor do we expect reexports to be an 
important share of total trade for the United States. 
From tables  5.9, 5.10, and 5.12, we  see that Hong Kong-China  intrafirm 
activity is significantly larger for most industries. For all products, 76 percent 
of Hong Kong’s domestic exports were related to outward processing in 1989, 
while the percentage of intrafirm exports for the United States was only 24.6 
percent. On the import side, the corresponding figures for Hong Kong and the 
United States were 58.1 and  15.5 percent, respectively. Using this comparison 
as an index of  economic integration, Hong Kong is clearly more integrated 
with China than the United States is with the rest of the world. Next we com- 
pare the outward processing activities of Hong Kong in China to intrafirm trade 
between the United States and Mexico. 
Table 5.13 reports related-party imports to the United States from Mexico 
in  1991. “Related-party trade” is defined in Section 402 (g) (1) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, as amended, to include transactions between parties with various 
types of relationships,  including  “any  person  directly  or indirectly  owning, 
controlling, or holding with power to vote, 6 percent or more of the outstanding 
voting stock or shares of  any organization”  (US.  Department of  Commerce 
1993). Related-party  trade includes  imports  into the United  States  by  U.S. 
companies from their foreign subsidiaries as well as imports by U.S. subsidiar- 
ies of foreign companies from their parent companies. I assume that imports 
into the United States by Mexican firms are small relative to imports by  U.S. 
firms. 
Related-party  imports  in  textiles  were  more  intense  between  the  United 
States and Mexico than outward processing imports between Hong Kong and 
China,  though  for  clothing,  the  figure  for Hong  Kong  was  much  higher 189  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.13  US.  Related-Party Imports from Mexico, 1991 
Product 
Share of Related-Party 
Imports in Total 
Product Imports (%) 
Textile yams, fabrics, madeup articles  58.49 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories  47.15 
Machinery, electrical and others  85.04 
Toys and sports equipment  85.28 
Electronic products and parts  89.53 
Metals and metal products  43.87 
All products  63.2 
Articles of plastics  59.33 
Source: US.  Department of Commerce (1993). 
(tables 5.10 and 5.13). For metals and metal products, the U.S. import figure 
was, however, higher than that for Hong Kong. Loosely speaking, FDI-related 
trade in 1991 was somewhat larger between Hong Kong and China than be- 
tween the United States and Mexico (for all products, the percentage was 67.6 
percent for Hong Kong-China  vs. 63.2 percent for U.S.-Mexico). If  we take 
FDI-related trade as one index of economic integration, then Hong Kong and 
China are more integrated than the United States and Mexico. 
5.4.2  China's FDI-Related Trade 
China's  customs statistics contain  information  about  imports  and exports 
related to FDI (or trade related to foreign-invested firms). FDI arrangements 
include three types of enterprises: Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures, Sino- 
foreign equity joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Contrac- 
tual joint ventures, sometimes called cooperative ventures, are flexible arrange- 
ments that may take almost any form as long as the arrangement is acceptable 
to both parties. Usually the foreign partner contributes funds, equipment, and 
technology, and the Chinese partner supplies land, factory buildings, labor, and 
raw materials.I2 Legally, China discourages  subcontracting in joint ventures, 
hoping for more transfer of technology and management skill.'3 
In addition to statistics on trade associated with FDI, there is also informa- 
tion about imports and exports related to foreign subcontracting, compensation 
trade, and processing and assembling operations (see China, General Adminis- 
tration of Customs, various years).I4 FDI arrangements are those in which the 
12. See Sung (1991).  Ash and Kueh (1993). and Fung (1997) for further discussion of the three 
13. But according to my  own interviews with  Hong Kong businessmen, in practice subcon- 
14. Ash and Kueh (1993). Sung (1991). and Fung (1997) discuss these activities. 
types of enterprises. 
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Table 5.14  Foreign-Investment-Related  Trade in Mainland China 
Trade Category  I992  1993 
Imports 
Total 
Processing and assembling 
Equipment imported for processing and 
Equipment and materials imported as 
Compensation trade 
Materials or components imported by FDI for 
manufacturing products for domestic use 
assembling 
investment by FDI 
Exports 
Total 












(5  1.89) 
(4.96) 
(32.92) 






















(I  .93) 
Source; China, General Administration of  Customs (various years). 
Note:  Figures  are in  billions  of  U.S. dollars.  Numbers  in parentheses  are  shares of  foreign- 
investment-related imports and exports. 
foreign investors have some legal control of the enterprises. In subcontracting, 
the Chinese partner has legal control of the operations.15 In processing  and 
assembling, the foreign entity gives its manufacturing operation to a Chinese 
partner, providing the necessary materials and selling  the finished products 
abroad. In return, the Chinese partner gets subcontracting fees for conducting 
the prescribed operations (usually no more than 10 percent of the value of the 
finished products; see Lardy 1994). In compensation trade, the foreign partner 
provides the Chinese partner with equipment and receives products in return. 
Outputs from subcontracting have to be exported. Outputs from FDI can be 
sold domestically (Sung 1991). In this paper, foreign investment refers to both 
FDI and foreign subcontracting. Until recently, investments from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan tended to concentrate on subcontracting, while investments from 
the United States and Japan tended to concentrate on FDI (Fung 1997; Fung 
and Iizaka 1998). Table 5.14 decomposes Chinese imports and exports associ- 
ated with different kinds of foreign investments (both FDI and foreign subcon- 
tracting) for the years 1992 and 1993. 
According to China's customs statistics, 33.0 percent of  1993 Chinese im- 
ports were related to FDI and subcontracting  while  17.7 percent  of  exports 
were related to subcontracting.'6 The bulk of imports associated with foreign 
investment were processing and assembling (37.7 percent of imports related to 
15. But in practice, the Chinese partner manufactures according to the orders given by the for- 
16. These figures are calculated by dividing foreign-investment-related  imports and exports by 
eign partner, who arguably has real control. 
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Table 5.15  Trade by FDI Enterprises in Guangdong Province (Customs Source) 
Enterprise Category  1989  1992  1993 
Imports 
Total  4.85  13.95  19.80 
Sino-foreign contractual joint venture  1.14  3.32  5.88 
Sino-foreign equity joint venture  3.11  7.43  9.28 
Foreign-owned enterprise  0.61  3.19  4.64 
Total  3.53  10.79  14.37 
Exports 
Sino-foreign contractual joint venture  0.71  2.40  3.35 
Sino-foreign equity joint venture  2.26  5.69  6.88 
Foreign-owned enterprise  0.56  2.70  4.14 
Source: China, General Administration of Customs (various years). 
Nore: Figures are in billions of  US. dollars. 
foreign investment in 1993) and equipment and materials imported as invest- 
ment by FDI (48.4 percent of imports related to foreign investment in 1993).17 
We can further focus on trade activity related to foreign investment in two 
provinces where foreign investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan is most in- 
tense: Guangdong and Fujian. There are two sets of  data on trade related to 
foreign investment in these two provinces, one from China’s customs statistics 
and the other from the statistical yearbooks of the respective provinces.18  The 
customs data show imports and exports related to the three types of foreign 
enterprises. Imports and exports of these foreign firms are growing rapidly. For 
example, in Guangdong, total exports from foreign firms grew by 33.1 percent 
while imports grew by 41.9 percent in 1993 (table 5.  15).lY  Trade (both imports 
and exports) related to foreign-owned enterprises is an increasing share of total 
FDI-related trade in both provinces. In Fujian, 55.5 percent of FDI exports and 
49.0 percent of imports were from foreign-owned enterprises in  1993 (table 
5.16). Since the tour by Deng to southern China in early 1992, there has been 
a rush of FDI to China from Hong Kong and Taiwan firms. Part of the general 
increase in imports and exports in 1993 may reflect this trend. 
The Guangdong Statistical  Yearbook and the Fujian Statistical  Yearbook 
have different classifications from the customs statistics, and the classifications 
of these yearbooks also differ from one another. The provincial yearbooks at- 
tempt to separate out FDI and foreign subcontracting. According to these year- 
books, in 1991,45  percent of Guangdong’s exports were associated with either 
17. On the export side, exports by foreign-invested firms  amounted to U.S.$25.2 billion, or 27.5 
percent of Chinese total exports (Lardy 1994). Total exports associated with foreign investment 
(both FDI and subcontracting) in 1993 were 45 percent of total Chinese exports. 
18. China, Provincial Government of Guangdong (various years) and China, Provincial Govem- 
ment of  Fujian (various years). Ash and Kueh (1993) also contains discussions of trade related to 
foreign investment in Guangdong and Fujian. 
19. Growth rates are not shown in tables 5.15 and 5.16. 192  K.C.Fung 
Table 5.16  Trade by FDI Enterprises in Fujian Province (Customs Source) 
Enterprise Category  1989  1992  1993 
Imports 
Total 
Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 




Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 


























Source: China, General Administration of Customs (various years) 
Nore: Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. 
Table 5.17  Foreign-Investment-Related  Trade of Guangdong Province 
(Guangdong Source) 
Trade Category  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Imports 
Guangdong imports  5.11  4.83  5.75  8.5  1 
FDI enterprise  1.13  I .95  3.30  4.5  1 
Exports 
Guangdong exports  7.48  8.17  10.6  13.7 
Processing and assembling  0.347  0.578  0.583  0.800 
Compensation trade  0.06  0.06  0.078  0.095 
FDI enterprise  1.20  2.28  3.72  5.33 
Suurce: China, Provincial Government of  Guangdong (various years). 
Nore: Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. 
subcontracting or FDI (table 5.17). The bulk of  it was from FDI enterprises 
(38.9 percent). In Fujian, 9.4 percent came from subcontracting (table 5.18). 
But there is no record of exports by foreign-invested firms in the Fujian Statis- 
tical Yearbook. Furthermore, if  we look at the reported FDI exports from the 
statistical yearbook and compare these exports with those in the customs statis- 
tics, the data differ quite significantly. In general, data from the customs statis- 
tics are more reliable. 
Another  interesting  question  about foreign  firms in  China is where their 
products are going.20  If they are made under subcontracting arrangements, then 
they are exported. But if they are produced by the three types of foreign enter- 
prises, they can be intended for domestic use or for export. In 1994, the Chung- 
Hua Institution for Economic Research reported  the results of  a large-scale 
20. For a comparison of  U.S. firms and Japanese firms in China, see Fung and Iizaka (1998). 193  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
Table 5.18  Foreign-Investment-Related  Trade of Fuijian Province 
(Fujian Source) 
Trade Category  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Imports 
Fujian imports 
Processing and assembling 
Equipment and materials imported by foreign- 
Compensation trade 
Components imported by  FDI for manufacturing 
invested enterprises 
products for domestic use 
Exports 
Fujian exports 


































Source: China, Provincial Government of  Fujian (various years). 
Note: Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. 
Table 5.19  Markets for Manufactured Products Produced by Foreign Firms in 
Mainland China, 1992 
Market 
Mainland  Hong  United 
Firm  China  Taiwan  Kong  Europe  Japan  States  Others 
Hong Kong/Macau  35.4  12.0  13.2  7.0  7.5  14.1  10.8 
United States  69.5  0.0  2.8  3.6  1.9  15.6  6.6 
Taiwan  59.6  0.9  22.3  4.1  2.2  4.8  6. I 
Singapore  55.2  I .o  9.7  9.0  4.2  8.0  12.9 
Source: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (1994). 
Note: Figures are percentages of the value of sales. 
survey in China on this issue. Table 5.19 indicates the export markets of  the 
foreign firms. 
From table 5.19, we see that most products of foreign firms are destined for 
the domestic Chinese market. U.S. firms have the highest domestic percentage, 
with a figure close to 70 percent. Hong Kong has the lowest percentage, with 
35 percent. About 16 percent of the value of US. goods produced in China is 
for sale back to the United States. For Hong Kong firms, export markets are 
evenly spread over the United States, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, with the U.S. 
market being  most  important.  For Taiwanese  firms, after China, the largest 
market is Hong Kong. But it seems strange that only 0.9 percent of the sales 
go back to Taiwan. One reason may be that, again, exports have to go through 
Hong Kong before they go to Taiwan. In sum, the picture here is that foreign- 
invested firms sell most of their goods in China. This illustrates the growing 194  K.C.Fung 
importance of the domestic Chinese market. For both  U.S. and Hong Kong 
firms, the United States is the next largest market. 
5.5  Issues Related to Illegal Trade 
5.5.1  China-Taiwan Illegal Trade 
As mentioned earlier, the Taiwanese government still has an official policy 
of no direct contact with mainland China. Much of the indirect trade occurs 
via Hong Kong as reexports. But Taiwan’s import controls on the mainland‘s 
products have gradually been liberalized. By the end of 1990, indirect imports 
of 92 items were permitted, including all agricultural and industrial raw materi- 
als (Kao 1993). 
Transshipment (using the Hong Kong government’s definition) means that 
goods are consigned directly from the exporting country to a buyer in the im- 
porting country, though the goods are transported via Hong Kong and are usu- 
ally loaded into another vessel for further journey.  Since transshipment is a 
form of direct trade, it is illegal from Taiwan’s standpoint. Transshipment is not 
a part of Hong Kong trade because nobody has legal possession of the goods 
in Hong Kong.2’ The goods do not clear customs. According to Sung (1994), 
Taiwan’s customs allow exporters to leave final destinations open and specify 
Hong Kong as the port from which goods will be transported elsewhere. In 
Taiwan’s trade statistics, such exports are entered under exports to Hong Kong. 
When the cargo arrives in Hong Kong, the shipping company can pick a main- 
land port as the final destination. 
Transshipment is different from transit shipment, which means that goods 
do not change vessels and just pass through Hong Kong on their way to the 
final destination. Exporters from Taiwan claim that their goods are going to 
Hong Kong when they leave Taiwan and then claim in Hong Kong that they 
are going to the mainland (Sung 1994). Unlike transshipment, this method of 
direct trade is risky since it involves lying to the Taiwanese government. The 
Hong Kong government has data on transshipments by  weight but does not 
keep records on cargo in transit.  The value of transshipments  is not known 
because transshipped  goods do not go through customs. Table 5.20 reports 
reexports and transshipments via Hong Kong between Taiwan and mainland 
China. 
As early as 1980s, fishing boats were conducting direct barter trade between 
Taiwan and Fujian. Fujian legalized this trade in 1985. But the Taiwanese gov- 
ernment considers  such trade illegal  smuggling. Researchers  at the Chung- 
21. This definition of transshipment is different from the term “transshipment” used in popular 
discussions of Chinese trade. In the popular press, “transshipment” is often used in the context of 
false declaration of  origins and  misuse of quotas, particularly  Multifiber Arrangement  (MFA) 
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Table 5.20  Reexports and Transshipments via Hong Kong: Taiwan and China 
Year  Reexports  Transshipments 
1989  2,897  (587)  33,283  (6,662) 
1990  3,283  (766)  43,757  (12,447) 
1991  4,685  (1,130)  272,475  (87,610) 
1992  6,336  (1,128)  527,427  (21  1,026) 
Sources:  Hong Kong Government (various years, b) and Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong 
Shipping Statistics (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, various years). 
Note: Reexports are in millions of U.S. dollars; transshipments are in tons. Numbers without pa- 
rentheses are reexports and  transshipments from Taiwan to China via  Hong Kong. Numbers in 
parentheses are reexports and transshipments from China to Taiwan via Hang Kong. 
Table 5.21  Taiwan’s Exports to Mainland China 
Reexports via  Reexports 
Year  Hong Kong  via Others  Direct Exports  Total 
1988  2,242 
(3.6) 
1989  2,896 
(4.4) 
1990  3,278 
(4.9) 
1991  4,679 
(6.1) 
1992  6,288 
(7.2) 
960  116  [2361  3.318 
(5.5) 
1,241  642  V931  4,779 
(7.2) 
1,405  1,361  [IS251  6,044 
(9.0) 
2,005  3,189  [3,399]  9,873 













Sources: Kao (1993). Sung (1994), and Taiwan, Ministry of  Finance (various years). 
Note: Figures are in millions of  US. dollars. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of  total 
Taiwanese exports. Numbers in brackets are alternative estimates from Sung (1994). 
Hua Institution for Economic Research estimated that in the late 1980s such 
smuggling of mainland Chinese goods to Taiwan was about one-third of Hong 
Kong reexports of Chinese goods to Taiwan (Kao 1993). For 1989, this esti- 
mate puts the value of such illegal trade at U.S.$195 million. 
Table 5.2 1 reports Taiwanese exports to China via Hong Kong, exports via 
other places (Singapore, Japan, Guam, etc.), and illegal direct exports (includ- 
ing transshipment, transit shipment, minor trade, etc.). Total Taiwanese exports 
to mainland China are significantly higher than “legal” trade alone. In 1991 
and 1992, the percentages of illegal trade were 3 1.3 and 36.5 percent, respec- 
tively. In 1992, illegal exports (direct exports) were between 52 and 60 percent 
of legal exports (reexports through Hong Kong and elsewhere). As indicated 
in  table 5.22, the corresponding figure for imports was between 44 and 76 
percent. 196  K.C.Fung 
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Table 5.22  Taiwan’s Imports from Mainland China 
Reexports via  Reexports  Direct Imports  Total 
Year  Hong Kong  via Others 
1988  478 
(1  .O) 
1989  586 
(1.1) 
I990  765 
( 1.4) 
1991  1,129 
(1.8) 
1992  1,119 
(1.6) 
205  n.a.  [I41  683 
(1.4) 
25 1  93  [371  930 
(1.8) 
328  320  1701  1,413 
(2.6) 
484  595  [5011  2,208 
(3.5) 
479  698  [1,219]  2,296 
(3.2) 
Sources: Kao (1993), Sung (1994). and Taiwan, Ministry of  Finance (various years). 
Note: Figures are in millions of US.  dollars. Numbers in parentheses are percentages  of  total 
Taiwanese imports. Numbers in brackets are estimates by Sung (1994). 
5.5.2  Other Forms of Illegal Trade 
While illegal trade between Taiwan and China arises primarily from the poli- 
cies of  the Taiwanese government, there are also other more standard forms of 
illegal trade  such as smuggling and tariff evasion, as documented by  Sung 
(1991), Lardy (1994), and West (1995). In  1993, Chinese customs seized a 
record of  U.S.$0.41 billion in smuggled products,  an increase of almost 80 
percent over the 1992 level. From 1981 to early 1993, more than 10,000 cases 
of smuggling at sea were discovered.22 
Geographically, smuggling as a form of illegal trade is now a national rather 
than regional  phenomenon.  In  the past, smuggling was confined mainly  to 
southern coastal areas. In recent years, it has spread all the way up to the coast 
of  Shandong and Dalian. However, it is unclear whether the increase in re- 
ported smuggling reflects improved enforcement or greater incidence of smug- 
gling. 
Smuggling is most popular for products whose import is restricted by  the 
government, either by tariffs or other barriers. From an economic standpoint, 
this illegal trade may be regarded as induced by inefficient governmental inter- 
ventions.23  Commonly smuggled items include color television sets, cars, ciga- 
rettes, motorcycles, air conditioners, steel products, and polyester fibers. In the 
first quarter of  1993, cars and cigarettes were reported to be the number one 
and number two smuggled 
One can often get an idea of how significant smuggling is by  comparing 
22. West (1995) contains a more detailed discussion. 
23. Some of the governmental interventions in U.S.-China trade are imposed by the U.S. govern- 
ment. In textile and clothing, trade is regulated via the MFA. In high-technology trade, the U.S. 
government imposes some export controls (Richardson 1993). 
24. See West (1995) for further discussion. 197  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
bilateral trade statistics, preferably by  quantity and, with some care, also by 
value. For example, according to South Korean customs, between January and 
April 1993 South Korea exported 26,688 cars to China, but Chinese customs 
statistics show only 166 cars imported from South Korea for the same period. 
One can infer that some of the “missing” cars have been smuggled into China 
to avoid Chinese customs (West 1995). 
In the first quarter of  1994, about 35 percent of the major reported smug- 
gling cases involved the use of  fake customs certificates, seals, and customs 
officers’ signatures. There are also false declarations of origin (Lardy 1994). It 
has been reported that a Thai certificate of origin can be obtained for as little 
as $100 (Sung  1991). The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reported that 
U.S. Customs Service officers have found Chinese goods illegally labeled in 
at least 25 other nations, including Honduras, Panama, and Hong Kong. 
5.6  Conclusion 
In this paper I try to clarify various conceptual and data issues related to 
China’s trade. China’s trade is characterized by  at least  three features: high 
incidence of reexports via Hong Kong, high incidence of trade related to for- 
eign investment, and high incidence of “illegal” trade, most notably with Tai- 
wan. There are also indications that illegal trade in the form of smuggling and 
evasion  of  trade  barriers  is  spreading to  China’s trade  with  all its trading 
partners. 
In 1993,67 percent of China’s exports were reexported via Hong Kong, and 
34 percent of China’s imports were reexports via Hong Kong from the rest of 
the world. These reexports complicate China’s trade data with all its trading 
partners, and not until 1993 did China differentiate these reexports from trade 
with Hong Kong. If we take these reexports and reexport margins into account, 
bilateral  U.S.-China  trade deficits (using U.S. trade data) must be adjusted 
downward by about 35 percent. Reexport and reexport margins affect not only 
Chinese trade data but also make other countries’ trade data with China inac- 
curate. 
Much of China’s trade is also foreign investment related. According to Chi- 
nese data, in 1993,45.2 and 33 percent of Chinese exports and imports, respec- 
tively, were due to foreign  firms and foreign  sub~ontracting.~~  In  1991, ac- 
cording to Guangdong data, about 44 percent  of  Guangdong’s exports were 
associated with foreign investments. Furthermore, there are good reasons to 
believe that this figure is understated. 
With respect to China-Hong  Kong trade, 74.0 percent  of  China’s imports 
from Hong Kong were related to outward processing in 1993. For China’s ex- 
ports to Hong Kong, the corresponding figure was 73.8 percent. Of the reex- 
25. In 1993,  exports associated with subcontracting alone were 17.7 percent while exports asso- 
ciated with FDI were 27.5 percent. 198  K. C.Fung 
ports of Chinese goods to overseas markets via Hong Kong, 8  1  .O percent were 
commissioned by Hong Kong firms, while 42.1 percent of reexports via Hong 
Kong to China were due to outward processing. 
“Illegal” trade between mainland China and Taiwan was primarily induced 
by Taiwan’s policy banning direct trade, Most of the legal exports from Taiwan 
to mainland China occur as reexports via Hong Kong. In  1992, illegal direct 
exports from Taiwan to mainland were between  52 and 60 percent of  legal 
indirect exports. There are also some indications that other forms of  illegal 
trade such as smuggling may be spreading. But other than a few isolated fig- 
ures, it is difficult to get accurate estimates of illegal trade. 
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Comment  MXCUS  Noland 
It’s  a dirty job but someone had to do it, and K. C. Fung has written a very 
useful paper plowing through the accounting morass of China’s burgeoning 
trade. I will simply elaborate on three issues: valuation, trade between Taiwan 
and China, and transshipment and smuggling. 
Valuation 
The issue of Hong Kong reexport margins is particularly salient because of 
the asymmetrical role Hong Kong plays in intermediating imports and exports 
in U.S.-China trade. The reason is that U.S. exports to China are concentrated 
in products such as aircraft, chemicals, and logs in which Hong Kong firms do 
not play much of an intermediation role and the products are shipped directly 
from the United States to China. In contrast, Chinese exports to the United 
States are concentrated in light manufactures in which Hong Kong firms are 
more active in ancillary manufacturing  activities such as packaging,  and in- 
deed many of these exports originate from Hong Kong-owned  plants in China. 
In any event, policy reforms and the real exchange rate changes of the late 
1980s have led to a relocation of  light manufactures production  from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan to China. Again, it would be interesting to evaluate the “shift- 
ing surplus” story depicted in table SC.  1 in light of Fung’s accounting adjust- 
ments. 
Taiwan Trade 
Trade between Taiwan and China is booming. In March  1995, Hong Kong 
replaced the United States as Taiwan’s largest export destination for the first 
time ever. In May  1995, the Taiwanese government announced that it would 
begin to permit direct shipping across the Taiwan Straits to the mainland. Trade 
was $14.4 billion in  1993 based on Chinese government figures, $13.74 ac- 
cording to the ROC Board of Trade; some 30,000 Taiwan businesses have an 
Marcus Noland is a senior fellow at the Institute for lntcrnational Economics and visiting pro- 
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Table 5C.1  Bilateral US.-Chinese Economic Area Trade Balances 
People’s Republic 
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-5.9  -  17.2 
-4.6  -  12.6 
-3.4  -  13.0 
-2.8  -11.2 
-1.1  -9.8 
-0.7  -9.3 
0.3  -  8.9 
1.7  -9.6 
3.9  -9.7 
Source; U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Nore: Figures are customs valuation, in billions of  U.S. dollars. 
estimated $20 billion (give or take $5 billion) invested in China. (Again, fig- 
ures are highly uncertain because of circumvention of Taiwanese capital con- 
trols.) Taiwanese firms are beginning to set up R&D facilities, as well as pro- 
duction facilities, on the mainland. And, indeed, the Taiwanese are probably 
the biggest investors in China. 
This poses a real political dilemma for the Taiwanese authorities. On the one 
hand, trade with and investment in the mainland is the logical result of shifting 
comparative advantage. On the other hand, increased contact poses a potential 
security threat in the narrow sense and loss of independence in a deeper sense. 
The Taiwanese government has become concerned about dependence, and in 
1992 the government introduced a new monitoring system based on customs 
data released by the Hong Kong government on growth rate and market share 
of 30 leading imports and exports transshipped through Hong Kong. The 100- 
point system is divided into cold, cool, normal, warm, and overheated. The 
government has also introduced a “Look South” policy of encouraging invest- 
ment diversion away from the mainland and toward Southeast Asia, but it is 
not obvious that the policy is having much effect. 
Some interesting surveys of the activities of Taiwanese firms in China have 
been done. In 1992, the Ministry of Economic Affairs found that 18.5 percent 
of firms primarily sold their output within the People’s Republic of China, 12.1 
percent  exported back to Taiwan, and the remainder primarily exported the 
output to third markets, supporting the shifting surplus story. Indeed, the wors- 
ening intellectual property rights disputes between the United States and China 
can in some part be seen as a case of Taiwan offloading its pirate activities (at 
least with respect to compact disks) to China. 
A subsequent survey in  1993 by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic 
Research found that 63.75 percent of Taiwanese firms in China primarily pro- 
cured intermediates from Taiwan, while 20 percent indirectly purchased parts 
from Chinese suppliers. 202  K.C.Fung 
With respect to financing, nearly three-quarters of Taiwanese plants in China 
are financed from Taiwan (72.25 percent), 17.2 percent get their financing from 
Chinese financial institutions, 7.0 percent are financed by  banks in third coun- 
tries, and 1.45 percent get financing from Chinese subsidiaries of third-country 
banks. In 1993 the first Taiwanese firm, Tsann Kuen Enterprise Ltd., an appli- 
ance maker, listed on a mainland stock exchange (Shenchen). 
Transshipment 
Last, on the issue of transshipment and smuggling, there is one channel that 
Fung does not mention. South Korean firms currently transship through China 
to North Korea and then back again. This trade is in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars and growing rapidly, though how it continues is obviously contingent 
on North Korea-South  Korea relations. Also, there is significant smuggling 
across the North Korea-China border. Again, observers have put the magnitude 
in the hundreds of  millions of dollars. 
The real money is in textile and apparel transshipment, however, and I be- 
lieve that Fung has grossly underestimated  the quantitative  importance and 
policy relevance of this issue. In an earlier version of the paper, transshipment 
to circumvent the Multifiber Arrangement was brushed off in two sentences, 
with the statement that the estimated $2 billion in illegal textile imports into 
the United States is an inflated figure from a textile producer group. My under- 
standing is that figure comes from the US.  Customs Service. 
China circumvents its bilateral textile and apparel quotas, mainly by trans- 
shipping products  through  third countries that are also covered by  bilateral 
quotas. In other words, the Chinese substitute their products for the unfulfilled 
quotas of third countries. A Treasury study also put the value of these transship- 
ments at $2 billion. The main transshipment points are the high-wage locations 
of  Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and Singapore. Textile and apparel imports 
from these four countries were $8.5 billion in 1993. In other words, the Trea- 
sury figure implies that nearly 25 percent were transshipped. 
A bilateral agreement on this issue was signed in January 1994. Government 
sources indicate that the problem appears to be getting worse, however. Ac- 
cording to the Customs Service (not the textile lobby!), there appears to be 
roughly $10 billion in Chinese textiles and apparel floating around the world 
not properly accounted for. 
For example, Chinese customs officials reported  $13 billion in exports to 
120 countries in  1992. Eighty-one countries alone reported $23.7 billion of 
imports from China in the same year. (The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Eco- 
nomic Cooperation reports $7.7 billion in textile and apparel exports in 1992, 
making the discrepancy even bigger.) 
China reports $6.4 billion in textile and apparel exports to Hong Kong in 
1992. Hong Kong reports $8.6 billion  in consumption imports (a enormous 
figure), and $9.7 billion in reexports. Even allowing for high reexport markups, 
these discrepancies are huge. 203  Accounting for Chinese Trade 
The Customs Service found that half of the 36 fastest growing apparel sup- 
pliers to the U.S. market had no significant domestic production for export but 
reported a significant increase in imports from China. Kenya, for example, has 
recently experienced a 790 percent growth rate in apparel imports from China, 
and a 212 percent  growth in exports to the United  States. Other countries, 
including Belize, the  Czech Republic,  Ecuador,  and  Qatar, exhibit  similar 
triple-digit growth rates. All in all, the Treasury Department estimates that at 
least $200 million of illegally transshipped apparel is coming into the United 
States through these countries. 
Transshipping is currently subject to criminal prosecution, and the Customs 
Service and the Justice Department have launched an ambitious campaign to 
prosecute  transshippers.  There was recently  a major conviction involving a 
Chinese state-owned firm. 
Transshipping is potentially a big issue. Growing imports from China put 
downward pressure on the wage rates of low-skilled American workers. More- 
over, the United States and China clash over issues such as China’s desultory 
human rights record and arms proliferation. This is a combination that is likely 
to spell trouble for U.S.-China relations and could have a big impact on things 
like China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. 
Conclusion 
When asked about an apparent musical plagiarism, Ringo Stan reportedly 
replied, “When you steal, steal from the best.” I will give a paper next month 
in Hong Kong called “China in the World Economy.” I am sure that I will be 
able to make good use (with proper attribution, of course) of “Accounting for 
Chinese Trade: Some National and Regional Considerations.” This Page Intentionally Left Blank